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Introduction
Political scientists have a love relationship with economic growth. Economic growth has become probably the first and crucial aspect we ask to have a picture of the performance of a country in a given time. Of course there are other considerations, such as inflation, unemployment, and debt (to mention just a few), but most of them are subordinated to growth.
If growth is vigorous and positive, then the picture about that country is positive. A negative growth, on the contrary, regardless of unemployment, inflation, and debt, makes us wonder and worry.
A shrinking economy has negative effects on democracy and a constantly shrinking economy might be a disaster for sustaining democracy. The reason is relative simple, a positive economic growth allows government and states to fulfil their policy objectives, expand basic services, provide a better standard of living to their populations. A shrinking economy, on the contrary, limits government's basic aims. The discipline of political science has virtually not seriously challenged this common wisdom. In this work, we take a much more skeptical view of economic growth. As most of the literature, we sustain its importance but we qualify our views claiming that a positive and vital economic growth can, under certain conditions, endanger democratic stability and endurance. 1 Very few scholars challenge the traditional perspective we have on the relationship between economic growth and democracy. Some voices, however, have long warned us that rapid economic "is a profoundly destabilizing force" (Olson 1963, 531) . Olson claims that a rapid economic expansion brings about shaking the foundations of patterns of production, consumption, and distribution, which erodes the prevailing order, producing, as he calls it, a "social dislocation" (533).
2 Moreover, a rapid economic growth constitutes a perfect environment for a revolution of rising expectations (Lerner 1958; Davies 1962) . This is particularly so when the number of losers substantially increase and start comparing their situation with new benchmarks provided by the economic growth itself. 3 In simpler words, people get mad when "they are not invited to the party." 1 "It would be absurd to attempt to explain political instability through economic growth alone" (Olson 1963, 543) .
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This derives from the study of revolutions. He claims that those behind revolutionary movements (left or right) are usually those, the déclassé, with weak bonds to the established order, at least in terms of civil society. 3 Olson was obviously not alone. Huntington makes an even bolder claim: "economic growth increases material well-being at one rate but social frustration at a faster rate" (Huntington 1968, 50 ). Yet, Huntington
Contemporary, the pace of economic growth is usually left aside, as far as it is positive.
Recent works sustain that positive economic growth is always constructive. Przeworski et al (2000) argue that the evidence they have is robust from virtually all angles:
"Democracies appear to be more sensitive to growth performance. When they face a decline in income, they die at the rate of 0.0512, so that about one in twenty of them dies, but when incomes are growing, they die at the rate of 0.0152, one in sixty-six.
Moreover, democracies that grow slowly, at rates of less than 5 percent per annum, die at the rate of 0.0173, whereas those that grow at rates faster than 5 percent die at the rate of 0.0132" (Przeworski et al. 2000, 109) .
They continue and bluntly claim that " Olson (1963) and Huntington (1968) could not have been more wrong when they thought that rapid growth destabilized democracies" (ibid).
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There is an evident and open contradiction between these contrasting views on the effects strong economic growth on democracy. This paper fills this gap claiming that rapid economic growth is detrimental for the democratic competition when the government has access to a significant share of the fresh resources coming from this growth and make a political use of this fresh surplus to cling to power. To maintain their power position, some governments curtail freedom of the press in order to bypass significant challengers. It does not mean, explained in due time, that rapid economic growth will be systematically exploited by the incumbent to curb democratic competition. Our focus on political competition reflects a scholarly consensus on the principle that vibrant competition is a necessary characteristic for a "high-quality" democratic process Pérez-Liñán 1999, 2002; Coppedge 2004; Diamond and Morlino 2004; Munck 2004; O'Donnell 2004; Carlin 2006; Levine and Molina 2011) .
We assess this argument by comparing the legislative advantage of incumbent governments in Latin America between 1990 and 2013. We use Latin America for two reasons.
First, Latin American countries benefitted from an extraordinary economic boom staring around 2003. In general lines, this era of prosperity encouraged the adoption of innovative social policies, facilitated reductions in poverty and inequality, and, in some cases, allowed for the replacement of discredited political elites. However, prosperity had uneven consequences for acknowledges that the relationship between economic growth and political stability varies with the level of economic development and therefor is more complicated than assumed (1968, (49) (50) (51) (52) (53) .
Some scholars show nuances on the effect of rapid economic growth has on democracy (Haggard and Kaufman 2016) . Moreover, they might appear as skeptics, but still they do not challenge the essence of this relationship. Other scholars, however, have argued that windfall revenues can hinder democratization (Ross 2001; Gervasoni 2010). political competition. In some of the region's countries, economic windfalls reinforced pluralist politics (Lanzaro 2001) . In others, by contrast, revenues were used by incumbent governments to sustain intolerant strategies vis-à-vis their opponents (Weyland 2013) . Because this regional economic boom was driven exogenously by the expansion of global commodity prices between
2003 and 2014, we analyze the decades before and after the commodity boom to minimize concerns about economic growth being endogenously determined by the quality of democratic institutions (Acemoglu et al. 2008; Bernhard et al. 2015) . Second, Latin America has a preferred spot in the literature on democracy, its breakdowns (Linz and Stepan 1978) , transitions (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986), consolidation (O'Donnell 1996) , or even quality (Munck 2016) .
Using this region back again, we fine-tune with previous works accumulation in the field.
The first section of this paper explores the contradictory effects of economic growth and identifies the mechanisms by which economic prosperity can undercut party competition.
During periods of fast social advancement, political leaders are uniquely positioned to constrain the parameters of public deliberation, embracing a model of intolerant progress. The second section describes the exogenously-driven commodity boom and how it provided a unique window of opportunity to overcome unpopular neo-liberal policies in Latin America over the past 15 years. In the third section we introduce our dependent variable-a measure of the incumbent's advantage in the legislature-and document the reduction of political pluralism in some contemporary regimes, such as Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, but not in others, such as Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay. The third section introduces our predictors and tests the moderating effect of free speech on the negative consequences of economic growth using data for 18 Latin American countries between 1990 and 2013. The results show that fast economic growth funded a decline in electoral competition when intolerant governments were able to restrict free speech. These findings hold even when we control for the effect of alternative moderators. The conclusions explore how economic progress may, paradoxically, undermine the sustainability of democracy and social equality over the long run. Our contribution lies at the intersection of institutional studies of democratic quality and resurgent debates in political economy (Luna et al. 2014 ).
I. Economic Growth, Competition and Free Speech
The literature on political modernization has argued that economic development facilitates democratization (Boix 2011; Epstein et al. 2006) , stabilizes democratic regimes (Przeworski et al. 2000) , and improves the quality of democratic systems (Diamond 1999) . 5 Several mechanisms are invoked to account for these positive effects: growth drives social and structural transformations that support political pluralism (Ansell and Samuels 2014) , it eases social conflict and redistributive tensions (Lipset 1959) , and it reduces the risk of coups in new democracies (Svolik 2015; Kim 2016 ). As development is critical for modernization which has its correlates on democratization, and development is reached through a continuous process of economic growth, economic growth cannot but have a positive impact on democratization.
Economic growth has become the leitmotiv academics and pundits reiterate once and again.
Nonetheless, the literature on natural resources argues that windfalls-particularly growth resulting from the exploitation of raw materials or foreign aid-reduces prospects for democratization by empowering incumbent governments. Rulers may use extraordinary revenues to strengthen their repressive apparatus, minimize accountability, expand patronage, and reinforce incumbency advantage (Karl 1990; Ross 2001; Paler 2013) . Others have qualified this view, noting resource-based growth can benefit democracy when rents placate the effects of social inequality or when a competitive regime is already in place (Morrison 2014; Dunning 2008 ). This is not to be read as a straight line that goes from the economy to politics, but to the political use of resources.
We focus on a specific manifestation of this problem: Can rapid growth strengthen incumbent governments and undermine party competition in democratic regimes? Svolik argues that democracies are always exposed to incumbent takeovers, but finds that, on average, economic growth reduces this peril (Svolik 2015) . By contrast, Wantchekon claims that in rentier states, growth breeds incumbency advantage because rulers enjoy informational advantages and can politicize the budget (Wantchekon 2002) . Again, the key aspect here is the political use of these resources aimed to improvements in the government power position, their incumbency advantage.
Our question transcends the specific context of rentier states. In Latin American presidential democracies, a buoyant economy encourages retrospective voting in favor of the incumbent (Healy and Malhotra 2013; Benton 2005; Powell and Whitten 1993; Campello and 5 See also (Ansell and Samuels 2014; Boix and Stokes 2003; Przeworski et al. 2000 Famines are easy to prevent if there is a serious effort to do so, and a democratic government, facing elections and criticisms from opposition parties and independent newspapers, cannot help but make such an effort. Not surprisingly, while India continued to have famines under British rule right up to independence (…), they disappeared suddenly with the establishment of a multiparty democracy and a free press (Sen 1999, 8 (Skowronek 1997) . This strategy questions the validity of adverse information, polarizes partisan positions, and reinforces party identity among followers and adversaries (Lupu 2014) . Prompted by this discourse, government followers harass their critics in journalism, universities, cultural activities, and even in the public bureaucracy.
Although such harassment is occasionally violent, more often critics are denied public employment or subject to cyber-bullying and workplace mobbing because of their views.
Like other forms of electoral misconduct, these practices do not automatically transform a democratic regime into a non-democracy, but they reduce the flow of information, limit the ability of voters to update their beliefs, and delay the successful emergence of party competition, even after the economic boom has receded (Donno and Roussias 2012; Alt et al. 2016 ).
We argue that intolerant politics is a distinctive example of structured contingency, a process by which structural conditions and contingent political choices have ultimately shaped lasting democratic trajectories (Karl 1990) . While the ability of presidents to embrace intolerant strategies can be facilitated by access to economic resources or limited by legislatures and other veto players (Murillo et al. 2013) , these practices are shaped, to a great extent, by institutional windows of opportunity and the rulers' commitment to democratic norms (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013; Kellam and Stein 2016) . Public resources may fund loyal media outlets, and weak institutions may fail to block restrictive media policies, but the government's willingness to manipulate free expression is determined by opportunities and normative preferences. Although this is a power game within the limits imposed by structural and institutional forces, governments have agency too.
II. Latin America after Neoliberalism
Around 2003 1990 1996 2002 2008 2014 1990 1996 2002 2008 2014 1990 1996 2002 2008 2014 1990 1996 2002 2008 2014 1990 1996 2002 2008 2014 1990 1996 2002 and education moderated the effects of economic growth on social outcomes: economic growth reduced inequality only when investment in human capital was above 7% of GDP. The benefits of economic growth were more equally distributed where "market-conditioning" policies strengthened the autonomous capacity of the poor to take advantage of an economic boom (Morgan and Kelly 2013) .
However, this extraordinary period of prosperity and social progress had ambiguous effects on free speech and political competition. Emboldened by growing approval rates, some
Latin American governments-but not all-adopted intolerant stances vis-à-vis their opponents.
They engaged in what Kurt Weyland called "discriminatory legalism," using their legal authority to undermine their opponents and narrow the range of information available to voters (Weyland 2013 ).
The region supplies several examples of strategies intended to undermine freedom of expression where it fully existed or to curtail it where was already weak. First, governments undercut critical media and supported the emergence of friendly outlets (Kellam and Stein 2016 ).
Waisbord identifies a "populist" strategy towards the mass media, characterized by legislative attempts to reshape the media system, the use of lawsuits to intimidate opposition editors, the president's discretional allocation of state advertisement and telecommunication licenses, and the pragmatic accommodation of media companies willing to support the incumbent in power (Waisbord 2013) .
For example, the telecommunications law adopted in Argentina in 2009 was directed against the largest media corporation in the country, and it was implemented discretionally when dealing with government allies. In Ecuador, President Correa sued critical journalists and newspaper editors, and the judiciary imposed millionaire fines and prison sentences-that Correa occasionally pardoned-against them. In Nicaragua, government advertising benefitted President Ortega's family and friends, while newspapers with 60 percent of the readership received less than 3 percent of public investment (Waisbord 2013: 71-72; Kellam and Stein 2016) . The media law adopted in Venezuela in 2004 banned messages altering public order, disrespecting public authorities, or provoking anxiety among citizens. The government cancelled or failed to renew broadcasting licenses for some opposition networks and imposed repeated fines on others (some even beyond those that had supported the 2002 coup attempt). By 2014, television channels critical to the government no longer existed, and a few struggled to keep a balanced coverage (Danielson et al. 2015) .
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Second, leaders in Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, embraced an intolerant discourse against critics, questioning their motivations and demanding that journalists and citizens adopt positions based on political loyalties rather than evidence (Waisbord 2013) . This strategy was adopted by governments on the right (e.g., Alvaro Uribe in Colombia) and on the left (e.g., Rafael Correa in Ecuador, Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela) of the political spectrum. Leftist governments in Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, and Uruguay, by contrast, generally expressed respect for critical arguments. Aragua being the prime target.
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The main target of such intolerant politics-and the focus of our empirical analysiswas party competition. While many traditional parties were hurt by the crisis of neo-liberalism, some governments took advantage of this situation to undermine all forms of organized opposition. The effects of this strategy were cumulative and sequential: in the midst of a crisis, an intransigent discourse facilitated initial electoral success; electoral success led to greater control over elective institutions and state resources; partisan use of state resources yielded greater control over non-elective institutions, such as the judiciary and the bureaucracy, and the action (or inaction) those institutions was ultimately instrumental to undermine critical media outlets, in ways that prolonged the government's institutional advantage (see Levitsky and Way 2010) . The electoral foundation of this process produced "vexing ambiguity" among many democratic observers (Bermeo 2016) .
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Governments also restricted the amount of public information available to their critics. Leaders shunned press conferences in favor of more controlled political meetings and manipulated governments statistics. 
III. Empirical Evidence
We have hypothesized that the relation between economic growth and the consolidation of 1990 1996 2002 2008 2014 1990 1996 2002 2008 20141990 1996 2002 2008 20141990 1996 2002 2008 20141990 1996 2002 2008 20141990 1996 2002 2008 2014 The V-Dem project operationalizes a wide range of democratic principles using more than 350 questions with well-defined response categories. More than 3,000 experts across the globe have participated in the survey, and typically a minimum of five independent experts complete each question for every country-year. V-Dem uses Bayesian ordinal item response theory (IRT) models to estimate latent country characteristics from the collection of expert ratings (https://v-dem.net/en/) (Coppedge et al. 2015b) . 1990 1996 2002 2008 2014 1990 1996 2002 2008 2014 1990 1996 2002 2008 2014 1990 1996 2002 2008 2014 1990 1996 2002 2008 2014 1990 1996 2002 To assess the impact of economic growth and free expression on party competition, we estimate four panel models using the index of legislative advantage as the dependent variable.
The rate of economic growth (lagged one year), the Freedom of Expression index (lagged one year), and an interaction between the two terms are our main predictors. We expect economic growth (in the absence of free flows of information) to display a positive coefficient and the interaction term to display a negative sign, indicating that the effects of economic growth on the government's ability to consolidate its power will vanish as flows of information become more open.
The models include several variables to distinguish the effect of our main predictors from possible alternative explanations. To control for the effect of electoral systems, social cleavages, and other conditions that may influence the number of parties gaining seats in congress, we incorporate the effective number of parties in the legislature (Laakso and Taagepera 1979) . Because many features of the regime other than the nature of public deliberation may affect the environment for political competition, we include the Polity score (lagged by one year) as a general measure of democratization (Marshall 2014 ). In addition, we control for the presence of an interim government (interim rulers with no formal support in congress score low in the dependent variable because the "opposition" dominates the legislature), for the presence of a coalition government (coalitions including small parties will score lower in the dependent variable), and for per capita GDP (to distinguish the effects of economic growth from the overall effects of economic development). Table 1 Alternative Moderators. Arguably, other factors could also moderate the effect of economic growth on the government's ability to consolidate its legislative advantage. For example, Mazzuca (2013) claims that rentier populism succeeded where fast economic growth coincided with a protracted crisis in the party system and in the financial markets, and Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2015) note that the erosion of political competition took place where presidents confronted poorly institutionalized party systems and weak state institutions. These arguments suggest that institutionalized party systems may be more resistant to the translation of economic growth into incumbency advantage. The argument is problematic, however, because a declining institutionalization of the party system is in part the result of actions taken by the government to undermine the opposition. Similarly, it is possible that the real factor translating economic growth into incumbency advantage is the use of public resources to undermine the fairness of the electoral process (Norris 2014; Donno and Roussias 2012) . Moreover, a general deterioration in the quality of public deliberation, more than any specific constraints on free expression, could undermine the ability of voters to update their beliefs. Because these conditions are likely to be correlated with an erosion of free speech, they are potential confounders in the translation of economic growth into government advantage.
To account for these alternative explanations, Table 2 incorporates three additional predictors (and their interactions with economic growth): party system institutionalization, clean elections, and the quality of deliberation. All three measures originate in the V-Dem project, and they combine multiple indicators through Bayesian factor analysis. The party system institutionalization index combines items for the strength of party organizations, party branches, party linkages, distinct party platforms, and legislative party cohesion. The measure of clean elections reflects the autonomy of the election management board's (EMB), EMB capacity, the quality of voter registry, vote buying, irregularities in voting, election government intimidation, electoral violence, and a free and fair process. The index of deliberation combines five items measuring reasoned justification, common good justification, respect for counterarguments, the range of consultation among elites, and the presence of an engaged society for each countryyear. Information for these items originates in V-Dem's expert survey (Coppedge et al. 2015b) . Table 2 presents three models including alternative moderators. The first column replicates Model 1.4 from Table 1 ; the remaining equations add an additional factor (interaction term) to regulate the effect of economic growth on government advantage. In all models, the baseline coefficient for economic growth is positive and significant, indicating that growth reinforces government advantage when the moderating conditions acquire values of zero. Because in these models two factors concurrently filter the effects of economic growth, the marginal effect of growth on the dependent variable is ∂y/∂x = b 1 + b 2 F + b 3 Z, where y represents government advantage in the legislature, x is the rate of economic growth, F is the level of free expression, Z is the level of the alternative moderator, b 1 is the baseline coefficient for economic growth in models 2.1-2.3, b 2 is the coefficient for the interaction between free expression and growth, and b 3 is the coefficient for the interaction between the second moderator and growth.
To assess the effect of these alternative explanations, Figure 5 The results in the first row of Figure 5 show that, even under adverse conditions, economic growth only produces a significant advantage for the government if free expression is constrained. This explains why attacks against free expression are a crucial instrument in the toolkit of governments seeking to consolidate power. The second row suggests that, under very favorable conditions-strong parties, fair elections, vibrant public discourse-free expression as such becomes less relevant as a mediator. However, empirical examples of those configurations The empirical evidence supports the main hypothesis advanced in this paper: when economic growth takes place in a context of free expression, incumbency advantage is transient and political pluralism is able to flourish. However, when leaders adopt an intolerant discourse and undermine independent voices, economic growth only facilitates the pursuit of a hegemonic project. This insight is confirmed by contemporary Latin American cases using different statistical estimators, and even after accounting for alternative mediators.
Although the Latin American experience provides an opportunity to leverage exogenously-driven growth to explore this hypothesis, our empirical findings are relevant to understand other cases of intolerant progress, such Hungary, Turkey, and Russia. The findings imply that, because the commodity boom receded after 2014, the ability of these governments to control the public sphere without significant repression will soon decline considerably. However, citizens will take longer to update their beliefs and challenge incumbents where governments have already undermined free speech and dismantled alternative sources of information.
Our conclusions also transcend any ideological concern for the left in Latin America.
Early attempts to dichotomize between a "good" (institutional, democratic) and a "bad" (populist, authoritarian) left simply reflect the heterogeneous strategies embraced by progressive political leaders during this period (Castañeda and Morales 2008; Weyland 2009; Levitsky and Roberts 2011; Luna and Filgueira 2009) . 15 Intolerance has also being practiced by right-wing leaders such as Uribe in Colombia or Orbán in Hungary, to mention just a couple.
Perhaps the most serious implication of our findings is that the politics of intolerant progress may have long-lasting social and economic consequences. The combination of windfall revenues and innovative social policies improved social conditions for the poor throughout the region. But intolerance also undermined the quality of democratic institutions, and several studies have suggested that strong democratic competition is a precondition for sustained growth and for sustained reductions in inequality (Huber and Stephens. 2012; Padovano and Ricciuti 2008; Besley et al. 2010 ). This resembles an almost perfect catch-22 situation.
Why are some governments willing to embrace an intolerant discourse while many others are not? Particular structural and institutional conditions may facilitate the emergence of intolerant politics. For example, Mazzuca (2013) claimed that rentier populism prevailed where fast economic growth coincided with limited access to financial markets, and Buquet (2007) argued incumbents are more inclined to embrace exclusionary electoral rules when they represent a growing political force. However, those conditions were detrimental only where presidents had hegemonic ambitions.
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See also (Harbers et al. 2013; Jahn 2014; Williams 2015) .
